摘要：This article studies the effects on accounting performance and financing decisions of Colombian firms after issuing a corporate governance code. We assemble a database of Colombian issuers and test the hypotheses of improved performance and higher leverage after issuing a code. The results show that the firms’ return on assets after the code introduction improves in excess of one percent; the effect is amplified by the code quality. Additionally, the firms’ leverage increased, in excess of five percent, when the code quality was factored into the analysis. These results suggest that controlling parties commitment to self restrain, by reducing their private benefits and/or the expropriation of non controlling parties, through the code introduction, is indeed an effective measure and that the financial markets agree, increasing the supply of funds to the firms.
其他摘要：This article studies the effects on accounting performance and financing decisions of Colombian firms after issuing a corporate governance code. We assemble a database of Colombian issuers and test the hypotheses of improved performance and higher leverage after issuing a code. The results show that the firms’ return on assets after the code introduction improves in excess of one percent; the effect is amplified by the code quality. Additionally, the firms’ leverage increased, in excess of five percent, when the code quality was factored into the analysis. These results suggest that controlling parties commitment to self restrain, by reducing their private benefits and/or the expropriation of non controlling parties, through the code introduction, is indeed an effective measure and that the financial markets agree, increasing the supply of funds to the firms.
关键词：Corporate governance;governance codes;agency theory;accounting performance;leverage;GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO;CODIGOS DE GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO;TEORIA DE LA AGENCIA;APALANCAMIENTO;desempeño contable;Governo corporativo, códigos de governança, teoria de agência, desempenho contabilístico, alavancagem
