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  • 标题:Study on Trust Countermeasures of SMEs RJVs Based on Reputation Angle of View
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Zongguo MA ; Konglai ZHU
  • 期刊名称:Management Science and Engineering
  • 印刷版ISSN:1913-0341
  • 电子版ISSN:1913-035X
  • 出版年度:2011
  • 卷号:5
  • 期号:4
  • 页码:21-25
  • DOI:10.3968/j.mse.1913035X20110504.z222
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
  • 摘要:Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) is an effective way for SMEs(small and medium enterprises) independent innovation. In order to realize cooperation across the organization and border-crossing, SMEs RJVs must consider how to reduce cost, improve cooperative effect cooperation, and meanwhile guarantee the flexibility of SMEs. The essence of SMEs RJVs is cooperation, and cooperation is closely linked with trust. Trust is the basis for the cooperation. In order to maintain the stable cooperation relationship and good operation, SMEs RJVs require establishing incentive mechanism for the members’ cooperation. The reputation of organizational members’ cooperation is undoubtedly an effective incentive. By using the KMPW reputation model of complete information dynamic game, we can analyze the trust problems of SMEs RJVs under the condition with information asymmetry. Moreover, the KMPW reputation model can also disclose and transmit the trust information about the enterprises effectively.Key words: SMEs; Research Joint Ventures; Reputation model
  • 其他摘要:Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) is an effective way for SMEs(small and medium enterprises) independent innovation. In order to realize cooperation across the organization and border-crossing, SMEs RJVs must consider how to reduce cost, improve cooperative effect cooperation, and meanwhile guarantee the flexibility of SMEs. The essence of SMEs RJVs is cooperation, and cooperation is closely linked with trust. Trust is the basis for the cooperation. In order to maintain the stable cooperation relationship and good operation, SMEs RJVs require establishing incentive mechanism for the members’ cooperation. The reputation of organizational members’ cooperation is undoubtedly an effective incentive. By using the KMPW reputation model of complete information dynamic game, we can analyze the trust problems of SMEs RJVs under the condition with information asymmetry. Moreover, the KMPW reputation model can also disclose and transmit the trust information about the enterprises effectively. Key words: SMEs; Research Joint Ventures; Reputation model
  • 关键词:SMEs;Research Joint Ventures;Reputation model
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