期刊名称：THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
印刷版ISSN：2171-679X
出版年度：2012
卷号：27
期号：2
页码：203-219
DOI：10.1387/theoria.4067
语种：English
出版社：UPV/EHU - University of the Basque Country
摘要：How many notions of cause are there? The causality literature is witnessing a flourishing of pluralist positions. Here I focus on a recent debate on whether interpreting causality in terms of inferential relations commits one to semantic pluralism (Reiss, 2011) or not (Williamson, 2006). I argue that inferentialism is compatible with a `weak' form of monism, where causality is envisaged as one , vague cluster concept. I offer two arguments for this, one for vagueness, one for uniqueness. Finally, I qualify in what sense the resulting form of monism is `weak'.
