期刊名称：The USV Annals of Economics and Public Administration
印刷版ISSN：2344-3847
出版年度：2009
卷号：9
期号：1
页码：219-224
语种：English
出版社：Editura Universitatii Ştefan cel Mare din Suceava
摘要：Nowadays, the concept of adding value for the shareholder knows a growing enthusiasm and this the more it knows the pressure of the shareholders regarding the continuous spread of the corporate governance concept, which came from the United States. The specialty literature and the practice offer a lot of possibilities of terminological designation of this concept, part because of the different translations of the Anglo - Saxon expression of “corporate governance”. The concept of “corporate governance” has developed from the agent theory which refers to the relationship between investor/shareholder and manager/administrator. And the problems that appear with that, and then extending to the whole range of relationships between all of those involved directly or indirectly in the enterprise’s activity, taking the concept from its narrow sphere of the micro-economy in the more width one of the macro-economy. In general, in an agency relationship, the leaders are mandated to enterprise any action according to the shareholders interests. Never the less, at the same time, they dispose of specific administration competences of which the shareholders are deprived of and have better information regarding the enterprise and its environment. This asymmetry of information allows the managers to orientate the enterprise’s administration according to their interests, which can differ of those of the shareholders.
