摘要：Conflicting interests and imperfect monitoring can induce financial institutions covered by the deposit insurance to run into more risk than the level aimed by its fund administrator. We test if the establishment of the deposit insurance (FGS) of the Brazilian Cooperative Credit System (Sicoob) did not induce moral hazard. We use a panel composed of monthly data for 180 credit unions (61.43% of cooperatives affiliated to Sicoob). Panel data models’ estimates using the Basel index as proxy for the risk exposure of cooperatives indicate that the FGS induced the moral hazard problem.
其他摘要：Conflicting interests and imperfect monitoring can induce financial institutions covered by the deposit insurance to run into more risk than the level aimed by its fund administrator. We test if the establishment of the deposit insurance (FGS) of the Brazilian Cooperative Credit System (Sicoob) did not induce moral hazard. We use a panel composed of monthly data for 180 credit unions (61.43% of cooperatives affiliated to Sicoob). Panel data models’ estimates using the Basel index as proxy for the risk exposure of cooperatives indicate that the FGS induced the moral hazard problem.
关键词：Risco Moral;Seguro Depósito; Cooperativas de Crédito; Índice de Basileia; Dados em Painel.;risco moral;seguro depósito;cooperativas de crédito;índice de Basileia; dados em painel
其他关键词：Risco Moral; Seguro Depósito, Cooperativas de Crédito, Índice de Basileia, Dados em Painel.
