摘要：This paper follows Rezende (2008) to investigate the determinants of bidding strategy in the Brazilian oil and gas auctions. The results indicate that strategies adopted by participants are affected by the “winner’s curse”. We also found evidence that the presence of Petrobras has a positive effect on winning bids. Furthermore, joint bidding is compatible with competition. Finally, there is no evidence of synergies between blocks. Thus, although there is room for improvements, results of the first-price sealed auction (without the possibility of bidding for blocks packages) are not much better than possible alternatives.
其他摘要：This paper follows Rezende (2008) to investigate the determinants of bidding strategy in the Brazilian oil and gas auctions. The results indicate that strategies adopted by participants are affected by the “winner’s curse”. We also found evidence that the presence of Petrobras has a positive effect on winning bids. Furthermore, joint bidding is compatible with competition. Finally, there is no evidence of synergies between blocks. Thus, although there is room for improvements, results of the first-price sealed auction (without the possibility of bidding for blocks packages) are not much better than possible alternatives.
关键词：Leilões de Petróleo e Gás;Econometria de Leilões;Assimetria de Informação.;leilão de petróleo; econometria de leilões; assimetria informacional
其他关键词：Leilões de Petróleo e Gás; Econometria de Leilões; Assimetria de Informação.
