出版社：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
摘要：Proponents of virtue ethics usually charge Kantian ethics with being act-centered because, they claim, its main object of moral evaluation are particular acts. This has the unwelcome consequence that an act can be morally worthy though the character who performs it is not virtuous. They also claim that ethics should focus on the character of persons such that only those acts that are the expression of a virtuous characters can be morally good. My purpose in this article is to show that the main object of moral evaluation in Kantian ethics is the character of persons. The categorical imperative does not demand the performance of particular acts, but the adoption of maxims of ends, which maxims are principles to guide a complete life. I claim that the adoption of such maxims necessarily requires the acquisition of a virtuous character so that whoever commits herself to living according to ethical principles both performs good acts and acquires a virtuous character.
