出版社：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
摘要：If I am not mistaken, our cultural baggage leads us almost automatically to associate guilt with a religious concept. To be more precise this has Judean-Christian roots. At the same time it also tends to lead to the identification of responsibility with strictly legal matters. Guilt is presented in close association with religion or, at most, with psychoanalysis, given that responsibility is usually restricted to criminal law or is associated in terms of protocol with polities. Nevertheless, although the words «guilt» and «responsibility » do not occur very often in dictionaries of ethics, they are key concepts in moral thought. My purpose here is to present them as dimensions or complementary aspects of our moral sense. It is of course possible for anyone to accept a specific responsibility without feeling guilty while, on the other hand, some people will always prefer to wallow in feelings of guilt without feeling responsible for the cause of the same. However, it is correct for both notions to work together with one accord. Guilt should therefore be a symptom of responsibility, while attending to our own responsibilities should be enough to ensure a complete lack of personal guilt.
