出版社：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
摘要：In this present work, I state, as a philosophical hypothesis of work, that moral pluralism could be a better option when it is confronted with monism (although it could be recognized that the arguments of both sides are not conclusive). From the point of view of this hypothesis, I attempt to characterize the main conceptual features of a «reasonable» pluralism In addition, I maintain that the possible implications of these features can imply some unacceptable consequences for the reasonable pluralist; in particular, some kind of moral particularism, some kind of moral relativism and some kind of fragmentation of values. In this last case the other consequence could be a so called «moral disintegration». My point is that these consequences depend on some sort of «conceptual pressure» exerted by different strategies designed by philosophers in their analysis of the concept of a reasonable pluralism.
关键词：Moral Pluralism;reasonability;moral relativism;moral particularism;fragmentation of values;Pluralismo moral;razonabilidad;relativismo moral;particularismo moral;fragmentación de valores
