期刊名称：Department of Computer and System Sciences Antonio Ruberti Technical Reports
印刷版ISSN：2035-5750
出版年度：2011
卷号：3
期号：2
语种：English
出版社：Department of Computer and System Sciences Antonio Ruberti. Sapienza, Università di Roma
摘要：We show how a monopolist in a primary market uses mixed bundling to extract surplus from quality-enhancing investment by a single-product rival in a complementary market, or even force the rival to provide low quality. In our model, bundling does not hinge on commitment ability. Although we assume that bundling creates efficiency gains, we find that bundling reduces consumer surplus and may reduce social welfare, even if the rival is not foreclosed, and investment is not blockaded. Nonetheless, bundling improves welfare when prevents inefficient investment. We propose to check bundled offers via a price test that controls the monopoly component stand-alone price to preserve efficiencies from both bundling and investment. When the rival invests, the test improves consumer surplus and welfare compared with the ‘do-nothing’ scenario, or a ban on bundling. The test is not consistent with the predatory pricing framework. Qualitative results hold when we endogenize the bundling strategy.
关键词：Bundling;Vertical differentiation;Price discrimination;Price test
