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  • 标题:Incentive Mechanisms for Tacit Knowledge-Sharing in Master-Apprentice Pattern Based on The Principal-Agent Theory
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Ruihua Wang ; Ruihua Wang ; Yongbo Lv
  • 期刊名称:MATEC Web of Conferences
  • 电子版ISSN:2261-236X
  • 出版年度:2017
  • 卷号:100
  • 页码:1-9
  • DOI:10.1051/matecconf/201710005005
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:EDP Sciences
  • 摘要:Continual knowledge sharing is the key to improve the competitive ability, operation ability and innovative ability of the organization. Through the comparison of the game theory, knowledge market theory and the principal-agent theory, the principal-agent theory is more suitable for the research on the incentive mechanism of tacit knowledge sharing in master-apprentice Pattern. During the process of tacit knowledge sharing in master-apprentice Pattern, different types of tacit knowledge determine the different design of incentive mechanisms.When the master and the apprentice share the inexpressible tacit knowledge, the organization does not need to design any incentive mechanism for promoting the master’s knowledge sharing.When master and apprentice share the expressible tacit knowledge, the organization needs to design different incentive mechanisms for the master and the apprentice respectively. Moreover the organization needs to take into account the different master-apprentice models in different departments. So the organization needs to design different incentive mechanisms for different departments in order to furtherance the tacit knowledge sharing in master-apprentice pattern.
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