标题：Stochastically Stable Equilibria for Evolutionary Snowdrift Games on Graphs * * This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant 61370030 and China Postdoctoral Science Foundation 2016M591649.
摘要：Abstract: In this paper, we study two-player evolutionary snowdrift games on regular graphs and identify the stochastically stable equilibria for infinite populations. We consider four different update rules: birth-death(BD), death-birth(DB), imitation(IM) and pairwise comparison(PC). With the same values of cost and benefit of cooperation, we show that there is a unique stochastically stable equilibrium for evolutionary games on graphs. If the benefit-to-cost ratio is greater than 1.5, then the proportion of cooperators of a regular graph is higher than that of well-mixed population. And for BD and PC updating, the smaller graph degree can lead to more cooperators. Besides theoretical analysis, the results are also demonstrated by numerical simulations.
关键词：KeywordsEvolutionary GameStochastic StabilityWell-Mixed PopulationStructured PopulationTwo-Player Game
