出版社：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas
摘要：Public goods having different proprieties produce different problems of collective action. This hypothesis has been discussed from different analytical perspectives and we examine their arguments, aiming to deepen our theoretical understanding about the logic of collective action. In this paper we look for similarities and differences regarding their use of concepts and expected results. Simultaneously, we examine the link between different public goods and the interdependent behavior of individuals. To this purpose, we also revisit the connections between production functions and consumption types in the case of public goods, as a mean to explore the potential development of more elaborated models in the theory of collective action, and suggest that more empirical contrast of these models is needed. Finally, we argue the importance for theoretical discussions to include a discussion about the impact of perception in the collective action models, considering systematic deviations to rational choice, and conclude that no single theory may address all collective action problems, but systematic patterns of behavior may be identified and empirically confirmed.
关键词：Game Theory;Interest Groups;Prisoner´s Dilemma;Collective Goods;Common Goods;Jointness of Supply;Teoría de Juegos;Grupos de Intereses;Dilema del Prisionero;Bienes Comunales;Bienes Colectivos;Oferta conjunta
