期刊名称：THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
印刷版ISSN：2171-679X
出版年度：2013
卷号：28
期号：3
页码：439-457
DOI：10.1387/theoria.4627
语种：English
出版社：UPV/EHU - University of the Basque Country
摘要：This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. The main motivation for the view is a fact that seems crucial to logic. As § 1 suggests, fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented.§2 spells out the view. § 3 dwells on its anity with a conception of logical form that has been defended in the past. §§ 4-6 draw attention to its impact on three major issues that concern, respectively, the extension of the domain of formal explanation, the semantics of tensed discourse, and the analysis of quantication.
