摘要：In December 1994, a Federal Constitution article was regulated determining employees’ participation in the companies’ profits or results (PLR). Thereafter, “PLR” was incorporated to the union jargon and sometimes used to compose collective wage negotiations, including on a workers’ category basis. This explicitly confronted the law, since not only participation is not supposed to supplement wages, but also profit and results are each and every company’s unique features. The purpose of this article is to analyze the mistakes made by companies when using such an important instrument, with the sole objective of reducing payment of social taxes.
其他摘要：In December 1994, a Federal Constitution article was regulated determining employees’ participation in the companies’ profits or results (PLR). Thereafter, “PLR” was incorporated to the union jargon and sometimes used to compose collective wage negotiations, including on a workers’ category basis. This explicitly confronted the law, since not only participation is not supposed to supplement wages, but also profit and results are each and every company’s unique features. The purpose of this article is to analyze the mistakes made by companies when using such an important instrument, with the sole objective of reducing payment of social taxes.
