摘要：The theory of large one‐shot simultaneous‐play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms—large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a single trait in which some Nash equilibrium distributions cannot be induced by the Nash equilibria of the representing LIG, this paper offers three equivalence results that delineate a relationship between the two game forms. Our analysis also reveals the different roles that the Lebesgue unit interval and a saturated space play in the theory.
关键词：Distributionalized games
individualized games
Nash equilibrium distribution
Nash equilibrium
representation
equivalence
weak equivalence
quasi‐equivalence
realization
similarity
symmetry
countability
saturation
C62
D50
D82
G13
