摘要：The increase in the demand for quality meat has created an organizational process for sheep farmers in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. These initiatives have turned possible the beginning of chain coordination actions, forming new governance structures. The aim of this study was to analyze the governance in the sheep production chain in Rio Grande do Sul, and to identify the main transaction costs in the farmer-industry relationship. The methodology used was based on case studies, using theoretical support from the transaction costs economics. Two governance structures that orient the transactions were found: market and horizontal coordination. Market coordination is characterized by the supply of commodity products, great number of consumers and traders and the inexistence of formal contractual relations. Horizontal coordination created an increased in the scale of slaughter animals originated from informal contracts between the production sector and the industry. In the market coordination, low asset specificity, smaller transaction frequencies and a higher level of uncertainty ex ante transactions could be observed. In the horizontal coordination, a medium rate of asset specificity, a higher frequency and an elevated level of uncertainty in ex ante and ex posttransactions were perceived.
