摘要：The role of corporate governance is to reduce the divergence of interests between shareholders’ and managers. The role of corporate governance is more useful when managers have an incentive to deviate from shareholders’’ interests. One example of management’s deviation from shareholders’’ interests is the management of earnings through the use of accounting accruals. The primary objective of this paper is to examine the association between corporate governance internal mechanisms (ownership concentration, board independence, CEO dominance) and external mechanism (institutional shareholders’) and earnings management. Firm size and leverage are control variables. The population used in this study comprises firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) between 2004 and 2008, the sample comprises 196 firms. Panel data method is employed as technique to estimate the model. We find that firms with higher ownership concentration and board independence manage earnings less, while firms with higher institutional holdings manage earnings more, there is positive significant association between the existence of CEO-Chairman duality and earnings management. This study also found a positive significant association between firm size and leverage and earnings management.
