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  • 标题:Group Testing Game
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Sadegh Bolouki ; Mohammad Hossein Manshaei ; Vida Ravanmehr
  • 期刊名称:IFAC PapersOnLine
  • 印刷版ISSN:2405-8963
  • 出版年度:2017
  • 卷号:50
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:9668-9673
  • DOI:10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.2047
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Elsevier
  • 摘要:AbstractGroup testing offers a cost/time-beneficial method to identify all, but few, infected individuals (defective items in general) among a large set of individuals (items). In a group testing scheme, a series of tests are performed on groups of individuals rather than single individuals. A test on a group determines whether the group contains at least one infected individual. This paper investigates the classical group testing problem from a game-theoretic perspective, where every individual, once called for a test, decides to comply with or defy the call. In this framework, an individual’s decision is driven by his knowledge of his well-being, that is healthy or infected. This leads to the so-called group testing game which is formulated in this work. Some simplified versions of the general game as a team game is then presented and analyzed, that result in some novel, generalized group testing problems to be addressed in future work.
  • 关键词:KeywordsGroup TestingGame TheoryBayesian GamesTeam GamesNash Equilibrium
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