期刊名称：International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations
印刷版ISSN：1923-2926
电子版ISSN：1923-2934
出版年度：2014
卷号：5
期号：3
页码：475-496
DOI：10.5267/j.ijiec.2014.3.001
语种：English
出版社：Growing Science Publishing Company
摘要：This article studies the manufacturer & apos; s pricing strategy in a supply chain with a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader specifies wholesale prices to two retailers who face advertisement dependent demand. Based on this gaming structure, two mathematical models are developed - the cooperative advertising model where manufacturer shares a fraction of retailers & apos; advertising costs and the non-cooperative advertising model where manufacturer does not share any retailer & apos; s advertising expenses. The optimal strategies of the manufacturer and retailers are determined and a numerical example is taken to illustrate the theoretical results derived. We show that cooperative advertising policy is beneficial not only for the participating entities but also for the entire supply chain.
