期刊名称：THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
印刷版ISSN：2171-679X
出版年度：2013
卷号：28
期号：1
页码：61-75
DOI：10.1387/theoria.1879
语种：English
出版社：UPV/EHU - University of the Basque Country
摘要：Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper’s conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism.
