期刊名称：THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
印刷版ISSN：2171-679X
出版年度：2015
卷号：30
期号：1
页码：73-95
DOI：10.1387/theoria.11913
语种：English
出版社：UPV/EHU - University of the Basque Country
摘要：Two key ideas of scientific explanation - explanations as causal information and explanation as unification - have frequently been set into mutual opposition. This paper proposes a "dialectical solution" to this conflict, by arguing that causal explanations are preferable to non-causal explanations because they lead to a higher degree of unification at the level of the explanation of statistical regularities. The core axioms of the theory of causal nets (TC) are justified because they give the best if not the only unifying explanation of two statistical phenomena: screening off and linking up. Alternative explanation attempts are discussed and it is shown why they don't work. It is demonstrated that not the core of TC but extended versions of TC have empirical content, by means of which they can generate independently testable predictions.
其他摘要：Two key ideas of scientific explanation - explanations as causal information and explanation as unification - have frequently been set into mutual opposition. This paper proposes a "dialectical solution" to this conflict, by arguing that causal explanations are preferable to non-causal explanations because they lead to a higher degree of unification at the level of the explanation of statistical regularities. The core axioms of the theory of causal nets (TC) are justified because they give the best if not the only unifying explanation of two statistical phenomena: screening off and linking up. Alternative explanation attempts are discussed and it is shown why they don't work. It is demonstrated that not the core of TC but extended versions of TC have empirical content, by means of which they can generate independently testable predictions.
关键词：Unification; explanation; causality; theory of causal nets; screening off; linking up
