期刊名称：THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
印刷版ISSN：2171-679X
出版年度：2015
卷号：30
期号：1
页码：53-71
DOI：10.1387/theoria.11733
语种：English
出版社：UPV/EHU - University of the Basque Country
摘要：Coherence is a measure of how much our beliefs hang together. Understanding is achieved when we see that something is not just a brute, isolated fact. This suggests that it might be possible to develop a coherence theory of understanding, which is what we attempt to do in this article using several formal measures of coherence. However, it turns out that a coherence theory runs into trouble with the asymmetry of understanding. We identify four difficulties and give suggestions for how they could be solved. These solutions all point away from coherence and towards a rather different notion, unification, which casts some (though not conclusive) doubt on the possibility of a coherence theory of understanding.
其他摘要：Coherence is a measure of how much our beliefs hang together. Understanding is achieved when we see that something is not just a brute, isolated fact. This suggests that it might be possible to develop a coherence theory of understanding, which is what we attempt to do in this article using several formal measures of coherence. However, it turns out that a coherence theory runs into trouble with the asymmetry of understanding. We identify four difficulties and give suggestions for how they could be solved. These solutions all point away from coherence and towards a rather different notion, unification, which casts some (though not conclusive) doubt on the possibility of a coherence theory of understanding.
