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  • 标题:Non cooperative Stackelberg network formation
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Juan M. C. Larrosa
  • 期刊名称:Cuadernos de Economía
  • 印刷版ISSN:2248-4337
  • 出版年度:2014
  • 卷号:33
  • 期号:63
  • 页码:339-358
  • DOI:10.15446/cuad.econ.v33n63.45336
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Universidad Nacional de Colombia - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas
  • 摘要:Non-cooperative network formation games in industrial organizations analyze how firms create links. We assume that links portray cost-reducing information and that access to this information is not reciprocal. We study the consequences in terms of profits if one firm can move first in establishing a link. A classic model of exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantage is observed.
  • 其他摘要:Non-cooperative network formation games in industrial organizations analyzehow firms create links. We assume that links portray cost-reducing informationand that access to this information is not reciprocal. We study the consequences interms of profits if one firm can move first in establishing a link. A classic modelof exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantage isobserved.
  • 关键词:Non-cooperative games;network formation strategies;Stackelberg equilibrium;sequential decision.;Non-cooperative games;network formation strategies;Stackelberg equilibrium;sequential decision.
  • 其他关键词:Non-cooperative games; network formation strategies; Stackelberg equilibrium; sequential decision.;C72; D43; L13; D85.
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