摘要：AbstractThis paper discusses a number of myths related to the trucking industry, its economics, and the industry response to pricing and what the author considers a fundamental truth and a possible course of action. The paper analyzes the empirical and econometric evidence about the behavioural impacts of freight road pricing, complements it with game theoretic analyses, and concludes that moving trucks to the off-hours require comprehensive policies targeting key components of the supply chain (i.e., receivers and carriers). The paper discusses the role of agent interactions and their role in determining freight mode choice, and the carrier industry response to time of day pricing. The paper shows that shipper-carrier interactions are part of a cooperative game in which both agents interact to find the overall optimal.The paper also shows the decision about delivery times is jointly made between carriers and receivers, as part of the “Battle of the Sexes” game. This suggests that moving truck traffic to the off-hours requires a change in the behaviour of receivers, so that they accept off-hour deliveries. This could be accomplished by a combination of financial incentives to receivers in conjunction with freight road pricing. Due to the fact that transporting during the off-hours is more efficient than during regular hours, it is likely that, should a sufficient number of receivers be willing to accept off-hour deliveries, the carriers will follow suit. The paper suggests a toll surcharge to finance the incentives to receivers.
