摘要：AbstractThis paper proposes a dynamic congestion pricing model that takes into account mobile source emissions. We consider a tollable vehicular network where the users selfishly minimize their own travel costs, including travel time, early/late arrival penalties and tolls. On top of that, we assume that part of the network can be tolled by a central authority, whose objective is to minimize both total travel costs of road users and total emission on a network-wide level. The model is formulated as amathematical programming with equilibrium constraints(MPEC) problem and then reformulated asmathematical programming with complementarity constraints(MPCC). The MPCC is solved using a quadratic penalty- based gradient projection algorithm. A numerical study on a toy network illustrates the effectiveness of the tolling strategy and reveals a Braess-type paradox in the context of traffic-derived emission.
关键词：Congestion toll;Dynamic user equilibrium;mobile source emission;dynamic Stackelberg game
