摘要：After the Latin American Debt Crisis of 1982, the official response worldwide turned tominimum capital standards to promote stable banking systems. Despite their existence, however, suchstandards have still not prevented periodic disruptions in the banking sectors of various countries.After the 2007–2009 crisis, bank capital requirements have, in some cases, increased and overall havebecome even more complex. This paper reviews (1) how Basel-style capital adequacy guidelines haveevolved, becoming higher in some cases and overall more complex, (2) how the United States (US)implementation of these guidelines has contributed to regulatory complexity, even when omittingother bank capital regulations that are specific to the US, and (3) how the US regulatory measuresstill do not provide equally valuable information about whether a bank is adequately capitalized.
关键词：bank regulation; capital adequacy standards; regulatory complexity; US banking crises
