期刊名称：Journal of Management Science and Engineering
印刷版ISSN：2096-2320
出版年度：2018
卷号：3
期号：2
页码：101-124
DOI：10.3724/SP.J.1383.302006
语种：French
出版社：Elsevier
摘要：Abstract:This study investigates a firm’s financing, investment, and payout policies through a rational expectation equilibrium based on which managers and outside investors have heterogeneous prior beliefs. The proposed model demonstrates that managers tend to overinvest (underinvest) if the extent of heterogeneousness is above (below) a threshold, which differs under distinct circumstances. Moreover, a price bubble is positively related to overinvestment, and the model shows that a firm’s optimal financing choices and payout policies vary with the assumption of heterogeneous beliefs.
