期刊名称：International Journal of Computer Science & Technology
印刷版ISSN：2229-4333
电子版ISSN：0976-8491
出版年度：2016
卷号：7
期号：3
页码：68-71
语种：English
出版社：Ayushmaan Technologies
摘要：Reactive jamming attacks caused by an energy-controlled malicious node has been countermeasure by using the timing channel. In this channel the information is encoded in the timing between events, and it is a simple logical communication channel. The timing channel information or events can not be jammed, even if a jammer is able to disrupt the attacked packets information, and also delivers the timing information to the receiver on jammed communication channel. The game theory can be used to structure the interactions of attacked nodes and the jammer. This paper, propose a game theoretical method of the interactions among the nodes violating the timing channel to obtain resilience to jamming attacks and a jammer is derived and analyzed. Importantly, Nash equilibrium is discussed under best response changing aspects subjected to uniqueness, existence, and convergence. And also, by considering perfect and imperfect knowledge of the utility procedure of jammer’s, jammer reactions on communication nodes setting strategies is modeled and analyzed and a Stackelberg game. Finally, this paper presents the numerical results and visualizes the impact of network parameters on the system performance.
