摘要：Controlling environmental pollution efficiently has become the common goal of the entire society. To explore whether the strategy of environmental pollution prevention and control formulated by the central government can effectively prevent the failure of traditional environmental regulation, the central and local governments were selected as the participants of a game model. The incentive mechanism was introduced into the constraints, the evolutionary game model of governments and enterprises was established, and the optimal regulation strategy of both sides was constructed from the effect of environmental pollution prevention and control. Results show that the key to preventing the failure of pollution control strategies is to introduce the constraints of the central government,allocate the cost of pollution control, and provide financial support for the prevention and control of environmental pollution. In addition, the central and local governments should adopt different prevention strategies. The optimal allocation strategy of the special funds for environmental pollution prevention and control at the central government level should be to correlate positively the amount of funds with the amount declared by the local government and show a marginal decreasing relationship. Local governments should not impose severe penalties on enterprises for excess discharge of pollutants.With the escalating discharge, imposing reasonable environmental taxes and reducing the marginal emission reduction costs of enterprises are better regulation means than increasing penalties.
关键词：Environmental pollution;Pollution control;Evolutionary game theory
