期刊名称：Central European Journal of Economic Modelling and Econometrics
印刷版ISSN：2080-0886
电子版ISSN：2080-119X
出版年度：2010
期号：1
页码：1-16
语种：English
出版社：Polska Akademia Nauk
摘要：We investigate the problem of setting revenue sharing rules in a team produc- tion environment with a principal and two agents. We assume that the project output is binary and that the principal can observe the level of agents' actual e?ort, but does not know the production function. Identifying conditions that ensure the e?ciency of the revenue sharing rule, we show that the rule of equal percentage markups can lead to in?ation of project costs. This result provides an explanation for project cost overruns other than untruthful cost reporting.
关键词：Moral Hazard; Team Production; Cost In ation; Pro ject Manage-
