期刊名称：Academicus : International Scientific Journal
印刷版ISSN：2079-3715
电子版ISSN：2309-1088
出版年度：2019
卷号：MMXIX
期号：20
页码：93-105
DOI：10.7336/academicus.2019.20.07
语种：English
出版社：Academicus
摘要：In his works the American philosopher Willard van Quine constantly rejects theanalytc/synthetc distncton claiming that it is not justfed. This happens because,in his opinion, human statements about the external world face the tribunal ofexperience not individually but as a corporate body, which implies that the judgmenton their validity ultmately rests on experience itself. Many problems arise at this point,since even language plays a fundamental role in the Quinean view, and it must beaccommodated into the picture if the picture itself means to be coherent. Conceptualscheme and external world are both necessary, but language does not seem to be afactor whose ultmate legitmacy relies on something outside the conceptual sphere,and this means in turn that we face a dualistc situaton. Conceptual schemes orworld-views, like the ones provided by Newtonian mechanics or quantum theory, arethe primary bearers of truth, and the truth of a statement strictly depends from thepartcular conceptual scheme one currently adopts.
关键词：conceptual schemes; empiricism; science; epistemology; ontology; language
