期刊名称：Organization, Technology and Management in Construction: an International Journal
电子版ISSN：1847-6228
出版年度：2020
卷号：12
期号：1
页码：2193-2199
DOI：10.2478/otmcj-2020-0015
语种：English
出版社：Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG
摘要：AbstractAlthough unsuccessful bids are usually discarded once the bids are opened under the typical lowest-price sealed-bid project award auction environment, considering efforts and resources expended by responsive and responsible bidders, it is likely that not only a successful bid but also unsuccessful bids can convey important information about the project at hand. This article documents an effort to answer the question that whether projects that receive more dispersed estimates at the bidding stage are more likely to experience greater project cost changes. Taking collective intelligence as the theoretical framework, a total of 210 projects conducted by the Ohio Department of Transportation between 2008 and 2018 were analyzed to investigate the relationship between the coefficients of variation of bids and project final costs. It was found that large projects with above-average coefficients of variation of bids showed greater deviations from original award amounts than large projects with below-average coefficients of variation. The finding enables project owners to study the projects before execution by recouping valuable insights from the community of bidders on the possibility of greater project cost changes faced by the planned projects without complex and mathematically rigorous models.
关键词：bidding data;collective intelligence;coefficient of variation;Welch's;t;-test, project risk
