摘要：For secure location proof in many applications, distance bounding protocols are considered as one of the useful tools that can be used in practice. In distance bounding protocols, a prover and a verifier can measure the distance between them by performing an interactive protocol. In general, the verifier is regarded as an honest service provider, and thus, an adversarial verifier is not considered for security analysis. However, we cannot ignore the possibility of the corruption of the verifier, which can spoil the prover’s privacy. To handle the security problem, a prover-anonymous and deniable distance bounding protocol is proposed, which can guarantee the privacy of the prover even though the verifier is corrupted. In this paper, we review the prover-anonymous and deniable distance bounding protocol in terms of the membership management, and we show that the communication overhead in the protocol for each membership change is inline-formulamath display="inline"semanticsmrowmi mathvariant="script"O/mimo(/momin/mimo)/mo/mrow/semantics/math/inline-formula where in/i is the number of users. Then, we propose an improved membership management technique, which can efficiently support membership change in terms of the communication overhead. The improved technique requires inline-formulamath display="inline"semanticsmrowmi mathvariant="script"O/mimo(/momn1/mnmo)/mo/mrow/semantics/math/inline-formula for each membership change instead of inline-formulamath display="inline"semanticsmrowmi mathvariant="script"O/mimo(/momin/mimo)/mo/mrow/semantics/math/inline-formula, as in the existing protocol.
