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  • 标题:Remuneration of Non-Executive Independent Directors Review the View of Representation Theory
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Ali Lalbar ; Mitra Mohammadtalebi ; Bahareh Mohammadtalebi
  • 期刊名称:Advances in Mathematical Finance and Applications
  • 印刷版ISSN:2538-5569
  • 电子版ISSN:2645-4610
  • 出版年度:2017
  • 卷号:2
  • 期号:2
  • 页码:45-51
  • DOI:10.22034/amfa.2017.531316
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Islamic Azad University of Arak
  • 摘要:Management is trying to maximize your rewards and that means in terms of net profit, return on investment (performance) or other accounting measures and also by trying to Making positive changes in the prices of corporate securities to be done. In other words, the maximum managers Their interests are trying to improve corporate performance and the improvement of the capital Investors will be aware of the attention and increased trade and thus share in research Willing to "review the independent non-executive directors' fees from the perspective of agency theory" discussed Is. The sample is composed of 92 companies selected by systematic elimination Is. The company had a total of 460 years. To analyze the data analysis and hypothesis testing This software has been used 7 EVIEWS according to regression analysis, the following results were obtained: Between independent non-executive director's fees and visible efforts there is a significant positive relationship manager. Between independent non-executive directors' fees and the number of board meetings there is a significant positive relationship.
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