期刊名称：Pakistan Journal of Statistics and Operation Research
印刷版ISSN：2220-5810
出版年度：2020
卷号：16
期号：2
页码：317-329
DOI：10.18187/pjsor.v16i2.3091
语种：English
出版社：College of Statistical and Actuarial Sciences
摘要：This article explores a supply chain model consisting of a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader specifies a wholesale price and bears servicing costs of the products. Then, both the retailers advertise the products and sell them to the customers. So, the demand of the products is influenced by selling price, service level and also promotional effort. On the basis of this gaming structure, two mathematical models have been formed - crisp model, where each member of the chain exactly knows all the cost parameters and fuzzy model where those cost parameters are considered as fuzzy numbers. Optimal strategies for the manufacturer and the retailers are determined and some numerical examples have been given. Finally, how perturbations of parameters affect the profits of the chain members have been determined.
关键词：Supply chain management;price;service and promotional effort competition;Stackelberg game;retailer advertisement;manufacturer service
