摘要：Budgetary constraints are prompting many governments to encourage private financing of transport infrastructure through public–private partnerships (PPPs). Fiscal support measures are often used to improve the financial feasibility of PPPs and to rebalance the economics of contracts to compensate for government-imposed changes. In the latter case, information asymmetry, political haste, and lack of competition may lead to poor government decisions in establishing support measures. Furthermore, lack of government support may lead to early termination of contracts and non-implementation of projects with high potential social benefits. This paper analyzes the awarding of subordinated public participation loans (SPPLs) to 10 brownfield shadow-toll highway PPPs in Spain after the government imposed additional works. It is hypothesized that, given the political importance of the projects and the viability problems they soon experienced, the government may not have set out the terms of SPPLs efficiently. This paper evaluates the financial and social impacts of awarding these loans to three of these projects to assess whether the government’s decision to support them was justified from a sustainable perspective. The results show that, while the government’s decision was reasonable, the design of the SPPL and its awarding conditions should be improved to ensure the public interest.
