摘要：Natural resources play a significant role in the development of the global economy. This refers, in particular, to strategic fuel and mineral resources. Due to the limited supply of natural resources and the lack of substitutes for most of the key resources in the world, the competition for the access to strategic resources is a feature of the global economy. It would seem that the countries which are rich in resources, because of this huge demand, enjoy spectacular economic prosperity. However, the results of empirical studies have demonstrated what is known as the ‘resource curse’. This article concentrates on the characteristics of the paradox of plenty, and in particular on the possibilities of preventing this phenomenon. The aim of this article is to identify the measures of economic policy with which to counteract the resource curse, based on the relationship between the state and the extraction business. Upon the critical analysis of the relevant literature, we concluded that the state’s economic policy, implemented in cooperation with the extraction business, is increasingly important for the prevention of the resource curse. In the context of the resource curse, the optimal and most consensual instrument, in comparison with other resource sharing agreements, is a production sharing agreement (PSA), which should also be adjusted to the current local economic conditions in a given country.
