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  • 标题:Verification and Design of Zero-Sum Potential Games ⁎
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Changxi Li ; Fenghua He ; Ning Hao
  • 期刊名称:IFAC PapersOnLine
  • 印刷版ISSN:2405-8963
  • 出版年度:2020
  • 卷号:53
  • 期号:2
  • 页码:16932-16937
  • DOI:10.1016/j.ifacol.2020.12.1236
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Elsevier
  • 摘要:AbstractZero-sum game is a class of game where one player’s gain is equivalent to another’s loss, which can be used in competitive situation. But pure Nash equilibrium maybe not exist in general zero-sum games. Potential games have nice properties, such as existence of pure Nash equilibrium. To combine advantages of zero-sum games and potential games, zero-sum potential game is proposed in this paper. Verification for a finite non-cooperative game being a zero-sum potential game is considered. Conversely, how to design a zero-sum potential game is also studied when the potential function is given. We show that verification and design of zero-sum potential game can be realized by solving linear equations. Furthermore, we find that if any two players play the zero-sum potential game in a network, then the networked game is also a zero-sum potential game.
  • 关键词:KeywordsZero-sum gamepotential gamenetworked evolutionary gamesemi-tensor product of matriceslinear equationverificationsdesign
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