摘要：Research background: Competition laws have become widespread and as a rule have a sanctioning nature. DANVERS refers an exponential increase in legal systems that introduced competition laws in recent years, accounting for more than 127 jurisdictions hereto. Specifically concerning the trend of criminalizing cartels, SHAFFER and NESBITT consider it due to transnational interests, and SÁNCHEZ defends a link between the economic subsystem as the engine of globalization and the economic law with the latter – where economic criminal law, competition law, financial markets law, among others are included - being subject to strong international influences, and possibly being moreover a sign of democracy. More than 30 jurisdictions already have criminalized cartels and STEPHAN mentions that about 60 jurisdictions already present internal legal solutions combining a reinforcement of sanctions with the figure of leniency, in a “carrot and stick” approach to destabilizing and deterring cartels.Purpose of the article: Considering the cartel criminalization trend in competition law, it is paramount to identify the underlying legal interests as a (global) recognized fundamental value, even if there are particularities adjusted to each legal order, and the purpose of the article is to identify the legal interests and adscription criteria that may be considered and retained as common in competition enforcement.Methods: normative analyses of the law.Findings & Value added: To discuss how to harmonize, in an international legal environment, competition enforcement.
