文章基本信息
- 标题：A Stay-in-a-Set Game without a Stationary Equilibrium
- 本地全文：下载
- 作者：Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen ; Mikhail Raskin
- 期刊名称：Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
- 电子版ISSN：2075-2180
- 出版年度：2019
- 卷号：305
- 页码：83-90
- DOI：10.4204/EPTCS.305.6
- 语种：English
- 出版社：Open Publishing Association
- 摘要：We give an example of a finite-state two-player turn-based stochastic game with safety objectives for both players which has no stationary Nash equilibrium. This answers an open question of Secchi and Sudderth.
