首页    期刊浏览 2025年06月12日 星期四
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Constrained preference elicitation
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Yaron Azrieli ; Christopher P. Chambers ; Paul J. Healy
  • 期刊名称:Theoretical Economics
  • 印刷版ISSN:1555-7561
  • 出版年度:2021
  • 卷号:16
  • 期号:2
  • 页码:507-538
  • DOI:10.3982/TE4208
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Econometric Society
  • 摘要:A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into “types,” and the planner wants only to elicit the agent's type. We first assume that beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of types is elicitable if and only if each type is defined by what the agent would choose from some list of menus. If beliefs are objective, then additional type spaces can be elicited, though a convexity condition must be satisfied. These results remain unchanged when we consider a setting with multiple agents.
  • 关键词:Elicitation; incentive compatibility; random mechanisms; C7; D8;
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有