摘要：After the cast ban on bike-sharing was lifted, bike-sharing entered the quota period. This notion means that the management of bike-sharing began to change from the unified to the diversified government governance, including all sectors of society. This work creates a dynamic game model based on the tripartite interest relationship among the government, bike-sharing enterprises, and consumers, and introduces the government quota policy and seasonal characteristics of bike-sharing into the game model. This model explores the multi-stage dynamic game process among the government, bike-sharing enterprises, and consumers. We draw the following conclusions. The government’s quota policy was effective during peak demand for bike-sharing, but not before the off-peak season. Through the case studies, we verify the feasibility of the government to relax the regulation appropriately in the peak season. We also changed the punishment and reward intensity of bike-sharing enterprises to consumers in the case studies and analyzed the influence of regulation intensity of bike-sharing enterprises on consumer behaviors. The final suggestion is that the government should appropriately relax regulation during peak demand season to reduce costs and strengthen regulation before the off-season of bike-sharing demand. Bike-sharing enterprises should maintain a high level of regulation on consumers, and a low level of regulation has no constraint on consumer behaviors.
