摘要：Cryptographic hash functions play an essential role in various aspects of cryptography, such as message authentication codes, pseudorandom number generation, digital signatures, and so on. Thus, the security of their hardware implementations is an important research topic. Hao et al. proposed an algebraic fault analysis (AFA) for the SHA-256 compression function in 2014. They showed that one could recover the whole of an unknown input of the SHA-256 compression function by injecting 65 faults and analyzing the outputs under normal and fault injection conditions. They also presented an almost universal forgery attack on HMAC-SHA-256 using this result. In our work, we conducted computer experiments for various fault-injection conditions in the AFA for the SHA-256 compression function. As a result, we found that one can recover the whole of an unknown input of the SHA-256 compression function by injecting an average of only 18 faults on average. We also conducted an AFA for the SHACAL-2 block cipher and an AFA for the SHA-256 compression function, enabling almost universal forgery of the chopMD-MAC function.
