摘要：The premise for institutional investors to participate in firm innovation governance and promote firm innovation’s positive role is that institutional investors have specific decision-making power and are willing to participate in firm innovation governance. Therefore, the influencing factors of institutional investment shareholding stability are an important issue. This study investigates the impact of business connection, risk preference, policy factors, market factors, and firm factors on institutional investors’ shareholding stability using regressional analysis based on the samples of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2014 to 2017. The main findings show that institutional investors with higher business connections, risk preferences, and performance ranking intensity have poor shareholding stability. The reform has significant investment constraints on non-risk preference institutional investors but has insufficient investment constraints on risk preference institutional investors. The substitution and interaction between firm factors and the natural endowment of institutional investors occur alternately. This study’s results provide important policy implications to strengthen related business supervision between institutional investors and shareholding firms. The policy implications include relaxing the investment proportion restriction and establishing a market-oriented performance ranking and institutional investors’ evaluation mechanism.
