摘要：This study explores the effect of themanufacturer’s dual-channel structure on the pricing strategiesand sales effort in a two-echelon supply chain. The retailermakes sales effort to achieve its economic goal. Twodecision-making models—centralized and decentralized—wereconsidered, and two game structures,manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS),were developed and their optimal solutions derived. Finally, theresults of the proposed game models were analysed via anumerical example. The results showed that in the centralizeddecision-making model, the prices in the two channels areconsistent. Meanwhile, in the decentralized decision-makingmodel, although the retailer makes sales effort, online salesprices are always higher than those of the retailer in themanufacturer-led supply chain. However, when the supplychain is dominated by retailers, the opposite result is observed.
关键词：Dual-channel supply chain; Sales effort; Stackelberg game
