首页    期刊浏览 2024年07月09日 星期二
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Yudan Pang ; Xuefeng Wang ; Hang Wu
  • 期刊名称:Behavioral Sciences
  • 电子版ISSN:2076-328X
  • 出版年度:2022
  • 卷号:12
  • 期号:1
  • DOI:10.3390/bs12010006
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:MDPI Publishing
  • 摘要:This study examines experimental evidence showing how ethics power allocation mechanisms affect an individual’s in-organization resource division and ethical behavior. We used two two-stage lab experiments to explore power seeking and usage; the experiments contained two stages of power contending and power usage. Stage one used two different power-seeking mechanisms in the honesty game. Stage two was based on the dictator game and the ultimatum game to measure an individual’s power usage. The results show that the decisions taken by power-holders could influence the optimization of collective resources, and power-holders who gain power with unethical methods could result in collective resource allocation inequities. With more balanced in-organization power, members tend to be more honest. Subjects also adjust their unethical behavior to adapt to the environment, which could cause the diffusion of unethical behavior. This paper re-designed the dictator game and the ultimatum game by adding an ethically vulnerable power acquisition mechanism. For organizations to prevent the disproportionate dispersion of resources and achieve more public benefits, it is meaningful for managers to create a proper in-organization ethical power allocation mechanism.
  • 关键词:enpower allocation mechanismsdishonesty behaviordecision makingultimatum gamedictator gameorganization behavior
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有