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  • 标题:A unified framework for CBDC design: remuneration, collateral haircuts and quantity constraints
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Katrin Assenmacher ; Aleksander Berentsen ; Claus Brand
  • 期刊名称:Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
  • 印刷版ISSN:1830-3420
  • 电子版ISSN:1830-3439
  • 出版年度:2021
  • 卷号:2021
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:European Central Bank
  • 摘要:We study the macroeconomic effects of central bank digital currency (CBDC) in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Timing and information frictions create a need for inside (bank deposits) and outside money (CBDC) to finance production. To steer the quantity of CBDC, the central bank can set the lending and deposit rates for CBDC as well as collateral and quantity requirements. Less restrictive provision of CBDC reduces bank deposits. A positive interest spread on CBDC or stricter collateral or quantity constraints reduce welfare but can contain bank disintermediation, especially if the elasticity of substitution between bank deposits and CBDC is small.
  • 关键词:Central bank digital currency;monetary policy;search and matching
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