期刊名称:Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal
印刷版ISSN:1096-3685
出版年度:2018
卷号:22
期号:1
页码:1-13
语种:English
出版社:The DreamCatchers Group, LLC
摘要:In perfect capital markets there should be no reason for choosing a particular financing instrument or specify attributes of these instruments (Modigliani Myers, 1977) can lead to the choice of an optimal financing policy. In addition, theoretical papers have discussed the relevance of several attributes of debt instruments including its maturity when capital market frictions exist. From a firm’s perspective, debt maturity can be used to reduce the costs associated with some market imperfections. Short-term debt can resolve debt agency conflicts. When debt repayments coincide with the realization of the project cash flows this eliminates the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977; Diamond Brockman, Martin Harford, Klasa Harford, Li Ben-Nasr, Boubaker & Rouatbi, 2015). This article attempts to review the theoretical and empirical work on the impact of debt agency conflicts, information asymmetry, liquidity and governance on the firm’s debt maturity. It also attempts to examine the empirical predictions of these theories using the context of Jordan..