摘要：This study empirically examined the impact of audit committee objectivity (contingent on CEO Power) on the quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian Banking Sector. The study adopted a survey research approach and secondary data extracted from financial statement. The OLS and LSDV analysis were used to investigate the impact of Audit Committee objectivity on the quality of financial reporting with or without CEO power and influence. The findings showed, that, while audit committee independence impact positively on the relevance and reliability of financial report, the same cannot be said when there was CEO power. CEO power in the audit committee mitigated the benefits of independence and caused its overall effects on financial reporting quality of no significant in terms of relevance and reliability. The study therefore recommended that having a majority of independent directors would increase the quality of board oversight, lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest and helps to repose inventors’ confidence especially foreign investors that would invariably draft in FDI. This will align boards’ decisions with the interests of shareholders they represent. This will reduce significantly the ability of the CEO overbearing influence on the committee activities in ensuring financial reporting quality.
